Control and manipulation are two of the most studied types of attacks on elections.
Introduction
Elections are an important tool in reaching decisions, in both human and online settings. With the increasing importance of the online world and multiagent systems, the use of * Supported in part by NSF grants CCF-0915792, CCF-1101452, CCF-1101479, and NSF Graduate Fellowship DGE-1102937. Earlier versions of this paper [FHH13a,FHH14b] were presented at the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the Fifth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice. elections in computer-based settings will but increase. Unfortunately, given the relentless growth in the power of computers, it is natural to worry that computers will also be increasingly brought to bear in planning manipulative attacks on elections.
The two most computationally studied types of attacks on elections are known as "control" and "manipulation." Both were introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89, BTT92] . In control, an agent, usually referred to as "the chair," tries to make a given candidate win by adding/deleting/partitioning voters or candidates. In manipulation, some nonmanipulative voters and a coalition of manipulative voters vote under some election system, and the manipulative voters seek to make a given candidate win. There is a broad literature on the computational complexity of control, and on the computational complexity of manipulation.
This paper considers control attacks against elections that contain manipulators. We consider both the cooperative and the competitive cases.
In the cooperative case, the chair is allied with the manipulative coalition. For example, perhaps during a CS department's hiring, the department chair, who happens to also be the senior member of the systems group, is mounting a control by partition of voters attack (in which he or she is dividing the faculty into two subcommittees, one to decide which candidates are strong enough teachers to merit further consideration, and one to decide which candidates are strong enough researchers to merit further consideration), and also is able to directly control the votes of every one of his or her fellow members of the department's systems faculty. The chair's goal is to make some particular candidate, perhaps Dr. I. M. Systems, be the one chosen for hiring.
In the even more interesting competitive case, which can be thought of in a certain sense as control versus manipulation, we will assume that the manipulative coalition's goal is to keep the chair from achieving the chair's goal. For the competitive case, we will look at the case where the chair acts before the manipulators, and at the case where the manipulators act before the chair. For control attacks by so-called partition, in which there is a tworound election, we will consider the case where the manipulators can change their votes in the second round, and the case where the manipulators cannot change their votes in the second round.
Our main contributions are as follows.
Building on the existing notions of control and manipulation, we give natural definitions that capture our cooperative and competitive notions as problems whose computational complexity can be studied. We note how existing hardness results for control and manipulation are, or are not, inherited by our problems. We prove upper bounds on our problems. For the competitive case, some of these are as high as NP NP , coNP NP , and coNP NP NP .
Those are very high levels of complexity. Yet they are tight: We show that there are election systems (having p-time winner problems) for which those high bounds have matching lower bounds, yielding completeness for those classes.
The fact that the upper bounds are tight does not mean that those high complexity levels hold for every election system having a p-time winner problem. Indeed, we show that that is not the case. In particular, for the important election systems approval and plurality, we show that the complexity of control in the presence of manipulators, whether cooperative or competitive, falls far below those upper bounds, even falling as low as polynomial time.
We also obtain cases, for veto (Theorem 4.8) and Borda (Theorem 4.9) elections, where competitive control-plus-manipulation is variously easier or harder than one might expect from the separate control and manipulation cases.
Related Work
The idea of enhancing control with manipulative voters has been mentioned in the literature, namely, in a paragraph of [FHH11] . That paper cooperatively integrated with control, to a certain extent, a different attack type known as bribery [FHH09] . In that paper's conclusions and open directions, there is a paragraph suggesting that manipulation could and should also be integrated into that paper's "multiprong setting," and commending such future study to interested readers. That paragraph was certainly influential in our choice of this direction. However, it is speaking just of the cooperative case, and provides no results on this since it is suggesting a direction for study.
The lovely line of work about "possible winners" [KL05] in the context of adding candidates might at first seem to be merging manipulation and control. We refer to the line of work explored in [CLMM10,BRR11,XLM11,CLM + 12]. That work considers an election with an initial set of candidates, over which all the voters have complete preferences, and a set of additional candidates over which the voters initially have no preferences, and asks whether, if the entire set of additional candidates is added, there is some way of extending the initial linear orders to now be over all the candidates, in such a way that a particular initial candidate becomes a winner of the election. Although on its surface this might feel like a cross between manipulation and control by adding candidates, in fact, in this interesting problem there is no actual choice regarding the addition of candidates; all are simply added. Thus this problem is a generalization of manipulation (as the papers note), that happens to be done in a setting that involves adding candidates. It is not a generalization of control by adding, or even so-called unlimited adding, of candidates, as in those the chair must choose what collection of candidates to add. In short, unlike control and unlike this paper, there is no existentially quantified action by a chair. (An interesting recent paper of Baumeister et al. [BRR + 12] uses the term possible winner in a new, different way, to speak of weights rather than preferences initially being partially unset. That particular paper's question, as that paper notes, can be seen as a generalization of control by adding and deleting voters. However, their notion is not a generalization of manipulation.)
The present paper does combine control and manipulation, with both those playing active-and sometimes opposing-roles. Manipulation alone has been extensively studied in a huge number of papers, starting with the seminal paper of [BTT89] (see also [BO91] ), which covered the constructive case. The destructive cases (i.e., those where the goal is to keep a particular candidate from winning) are due to [CSL07] . Control alone has been extensively studied in many papers, with the seminal paper being [BTT92] , which covered the constructive case. The destructive cases were first studied in [HHR07] . There has been quite a bit of work on finding systems for which conducting various types of manipulation is hard, or for which conducting most types of control attacks is hard, see, e.g., [ENR09, FHHR09a,HHR09,Men13,MS13,PX12,EFRS15] or the surveys [FHHR09b, FHH10, CW16, FR16] .
In the present paper, we will see that who goes first, the chair or the manipulators, is important in determining what complexity upper bounds apply. Order has also been seen to be important in the study of so-called online control attacks [HHR12b, HHR12a] , and of online manipulation attacks [HHR14] . However, the papers just mentioned are separately about control, and about manipulation. In contrast we are mostly interested in when both are occurring, and especially when the two attacks are in conflict with each other.
The present paper also looks at how revoting affects the complexity of elections that involve both control and manipulation. It is important to mention that, for the case of just manipulation, [NW12,NW13] (see also [FHH16] ) have recently discussed revoting, and give an example that shows that revoting can sometimes be a valuable tool for the manipulator.
Preliminaries
An election (a.k.a. a social choice correspondence) maps from a finite candidate set C and a finite vote collection V to a set, W ⊆ C, called the winner(s) [SL09]. Candidates each have a corresponding name, and these names play an important role in some of our results. Voters come without names, and the votes are input as a list, i.e., as ballots. For approval elections, each ballot is a length-C 0-1 vector indicating whether each candidate is disapproved or approved. The candidate getting the most approvals is the winner (or winners if candidates tie for most). For all other systems we discuss, each ballot is a tie-free linear ordering of the candidates. For plurality elections, each voter gives one point to his or her top choice and zero to the rest. For veto elections, each voter gives zero points to his or her bottom choice and one to the rest. For Borda elections, each voter gives zero points to his or her bottom choice, one point to his or her next to bottom choice, and so on through giving C − 1 points to his or her top choice. In the three systems just mentioned, the winner is the candidate(s) who receives the most points. In a Condorcet election- [BTT92] recast the notion of a Condorcet winner [Con85] into an election system of sorts, in this way, and used it as one of their focus cases in their seminal control study-a candidate p is a winner exactly if for each other candidate b it holds that strictly more than half the votes cast prefer p to b. Unlike the systems from earlier in this paragraph, Condorcet elections on some inputs may have no winners.
An election system E is said to have a p-time winner problem if there is a polynomialtime algorithm that on input C, V , and p ∈ C, determines whether p is a winner under E of the election over C with the votes being V .
We assume the reader is aware of the NP, coNP NP , NP NP , and coNP NP NP levels of the polynomial hierarchy (the "exponentiation" notation denotes oracle class, informally put, having unit-cost access to a set of one's choice from the given class) [MS72,Sto76]. DP is the class of languages that are the difference of two languages in NP [PY84]. We assume that the reader is familiar with many-one reductions (which here always means many-one polynomial-time reductions). As is standard, we use ≤ p m to denote many-one reductions. There are far fewer completeness results for levels of the hierarchy beyond NP, such as the abovementioned ones, than there are for NP; a collection of and discussion of such results can be found in [SU02a,SU02b]. Completeness and hardness here are always with respect to many-one reductions.
For proofs of the cases of Theorem 4.2 we reduce from Quantified Boolean Formulas (QBF) where formulas are restricted to k alternating quantifiers where each quantifier quantifies over a list of boolean variables. The problem QBF k is the case of k alternating quantifiers beginning with ∃ and similarly QBF k is the case of k alternating quantifiers beginning with ∀; QBF 2 is NP NP -hard, QBF 2 is coNP NP -hard, and QBF 3 is coNP NP NPhard [SM73,Wra76]. In all our proofs using QBF k or QBF k we assume without loss of generality that the same number of variables are bound to each quantifier.
Our hardness results are worst-case results. However, it is known that if there exists even one set that is hard for NP (and note that all sets hard for coNP NP , NP NP , or coNP NP NP are hard for NP) and has a (deterministic) heuristic algorithm whose asymptotic error rate is subexponential, then the polynomial hierarchy collapses. See [HW12] for a discussion of that, and an attempt to reconcile that with the fact that in practice heuristics often do seem to do well, including for some cases related to elections, see, e.g., [Wal09].
Types of Electoral Control
We now briefly define all standard control types. For a more formal description we refer the reader to the detailed definitions given in [FHHR09a] . Given as input an election, (C, V ), a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and an integer k ≥ 0, the constructive (respectively, destructive) control by deleting voters-for short CCDV (respectively, DCDV)-problem for an election system E asks whether there is some choice of at most k votes such that if they are removed, p is a winner (respectively, is not a winner) of the given election under E. We are in the so-called nonunique-winner model, and so we ask about making p "a winner" rather than "the one and only winner," which is the so-called unique-winner model. 1 Each of those problems has an adding voters (AV) analogue, in which one has a collection of registered voters, and has a collection of "unregistered" voters, and the question is whether there is some choice of at most k voters from the collection of unregistered voters such that if they are added, the goal is met. These types of control are motivated by issues ranging from voter suppression to targeted phone calls to get-out-the-vote drives. There are the natural analogous types for adding and deleting candidates, AC and DC (note: in the destructive control by deleting candidates case-DCDC-deleting p is not allowed [BTT92] ).
The partition types are called runoff partition of candidates (RPC), partition of candidates (PC), and partition of voters (PV). In each of the three partition control types, the input is just (C, V ) and p ∈ C, and a two-stage election is performed. In RPC, the constructive (destructive) question is whether there exists a partition of the candidates into C 1 and C 2 such that if the candidates who survive at least one of the elections (C 1 , V ) and (C 2 , V ) move on to a final election among just them with the collection of votes V , p is (is not) a winner. Here, there are two models for what "survive" means. In the ties eliminate (TE) model, to move forward one must uniquely win a first-round election; in the ties promote (TP) model, it suffices to be a winner of a first-round election. The PC case is similar, but the winners of the election (C 1 , V ) move on to a final election with all the candidates in C 2 . 2 In PV, we instead consider a partition of the collection of voters V into V 1 and V 2 where the runoff consists of the candidates that survive at least one of the elections (C, V 1 ) and (C, V 2 ).
Manipulation
As to manipulation, the constructive (destructive) unweighted coalitional manipulation CUCM (DUCM) problem under election system E has as input C, p ∈ C, a collection of nonmanipulative voters each specified by his or her vote (linear order or approval vector, as appropriate), and a collection of manipulator voters (coming in as blank slates, e.g., input as a string 1 j to indicate there are j of them), and the question is whether there is some way of setting the votes of the manipulative coalition so that p is (is not) a winner of the resulting election under system E with those votes and the nonmanipulative votes both being cast.
Control-plus-Manipulation
Our model of allowing control in the presence of manipulators varies the standard control definitions to allow some of the voters to be manipulators, and thus to come in as blank slates. We mention that for AV, it is legal to have manipulators among the registered and/or the unregistered votes. For the cooperative cases, the question is whether the chair can choose preferences for the manipulators such that, along with using his or her legal controldecision ability for that control type, p can be made (precluded from being) a winner. We denote these types by adding in an "M+," e.g., plurality-M+CCAV. For the competitive cases, we can look at the case where the manipulative coalition sets its votes and then the chair chooses a control action, and we call that MF for "manipulators first." Or we can have the chair control first and then the manipulators set their votes, which we call CF for "chair first." Since the manipulators seek to thwart the chair, the case Borda-CCAV-MF, for example, asks whether under Borda, no matter how the manipulative voters, moving first, set their votes, there will exist some choice of at most k unregistered voters that the chair can add so that p is a winner. For partition cases, we add the string "-revoting" to indicate that after the first-round elections occur, the manipulators can change their votes in the final election.
To allow many things to be spoken of compactly, we use "stacked" notation to indicate every possible string one gets by reading across and taking one choice from each bracket one encounters on one's path across the expression. So, for example, CC A D V-CF MF refers to four control types, not just two, and
control types. Notice that for our competitive setting, we seem to be asymmetrically focusing on things from the perspective of the chair. That is, regardless of whether the chair moves first or whether the manipulators move first, our problems are always posed in terms of the chair's constructive or destructive goal regarding the candidate p. It would be natural to ask-and indeed, a conference referee asked us to address the issue of-whether one can interestingly study the competitive problem from the perspective of the manipulators rather than that of the chair. That is, in the MF case for example, one would ask whether the manipulators can act so as to achieve or block victory for p, regardless of the actions of the chair that follow. And one could similarly look at the CF case from the manipulators' perspective. After all, in many real-world settings, what one cares about may well be the perspective of the manipulators. Thus being able to address this issue would itself be an additional motivation for our paper. Fortunately, in the competitive case-and this holds in both the nonuniquewinner model and the unique-winner model, and holds for all types of constructive and destructive attacks discussed here-the chair achieving his or her goal in the model where we view things from the perspective of the chair is precisely the same as the manipulators failing to meet their goal in the model where we view things from the perspective of the manipulators. This follows from the definitions. Thus this paper is implicitly handling the case of the manipulators' perspective: For all our competitive cases, studying a constructive (respectively, destructive) attack problem from the perspective of the manipulators is exactly the same as studying the complement of the destructive (respectively, constructive) version of the same problem in the model of this paper, that is, from the perspective of the chair. For example, the sets E-DCAV-CF-ManipulatorFocus and E-CCAV-CF-ChairFocus are the same on all syntactically legal inputs (and they will of course differ on all syntactically illegal inputs). (We will not use "focus" suffixes in this paper except in the previous sentence, since in this paper our all our problems will implicitly be "-ChairFocus.") We caution that the above discussion should not be interpreted as saying that the constructive and destructive problems are each other's opposites. That is not true, although there is a partial connection between these cases, see the discussion in footnote 5 of [HHR07] . 
Results

Inheritance
Each control type many-one reduces to each of its cooperative and to each of its competitive control-plus-manipulation variants, because for those variants the zero-manipulator cases degenerate to the pure control case. For example, E-CCDV ≤ p m E-M+CCDV and E-CCDV ≤ p m E-CCDV-MF. In particular, NP-hardness results for control inherit upward to each related cooperative and competitive case.
For manipulation, the inheritance behavior is not as broad, since partition control cannot necessarily be "canceled out" by setting a parameter to zero, as partition doesn't even have a numerical parameter. Nonpartition control types do display inheritance, but for the competitive cases there is some "flipping" of the type of control and the set involved. For each constructive (respectively, destructive) control type regarding adding or deleting candidates or voters, destructive (respectively, constructive) manipulation many-one reduces to the complement of the set capturing the competitive case of the constructive (respectively, destructive) control type combined with manipulation. For example, E-CUCM ≤ p m E-DCAC-CF and E-DUCM ≤ p m E-CCDV-MF. For the cooperative cases there is no "flipping." For each constructive or destructive control type regarding adding or deleting candidates or voters, manipulation many-one reduces to the cooperative case of that control type combined with manipulation. For example, E-CUCM ≤ p m E-M+CCAC and E-DUCM ≤ p m E-M+DCAC.
General Upper Bounds and Matching Lower Bounds
For election systems with p-time winner problems, all the cooperative cases clearly have NP upper bounds. But the upper bounds for the competitive cases are far higher, falling in the second and third levels of the polynomial hierarchy, as described by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 For each election system E having a p-time winner problem, the bounds of Table 1 hold. 3
Although the table's upper bounds clearly follow from the structure of the problems (only for the coDP cases is this nontrivial, see Theorem A.8), the bounds are very high.
Can they be improved by some cleverer approach? Or are there systems with p-time winner problems that show the bounds to be tight? The following result establishes that the latter holds; each of the cells in the table is tight for at least some cases.
Theorem 4. 2 1. For each of the eight problems on the top line of Table 1 , and each of the columns on that line, there exists an election system E, which has a p-time winner problem, for which the named problem is complete for the named complexity class. 4 2. For each of CCPV-TP and CCPV-TE, and each of the CF, CF-revoting, and MF columns of Table 1 , and each of the columns on that line, there exists an election system E, which has a p-time winner problem, for which the named problem is complete for the named complexity class.
3. There exists an election system E, which has a p-time winner problem, for which CCPV-TP-MF-revoting is coNP NP NP -complete, and there exists an election system E, which has a p-time winner problem, for which CCPV-TE-MF-revoting is coNP NPcomplete.
The above result says that the upper bounds are not needlessly high. They are truly needed, at least for some systems. However, the constructions proving the lower bounds are artificial and the construction involving the third level of the polynomial hierarchy is lengthy and difficult. 5 In particular, this leaves completely open the possibility that for particular, important real-world systems, even the competitive cases may be far simpler than those bounds suggest. In the coming section, we will see that indeed for some of the most important real-world systems, even in the presence of manipulators, the control problem is just as computationally easy as when there are no manipulators.
We now present the proof of the CCAC-CF case of Theorem 4.2, which illustrates the general arguments used in the proof of this theorem. The proofs of the other cases can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 4.3 There exists an election system, E, with a p-time winner problem, such that E-CCAC-CF is NP NP -complete.
Proof. Let E be defined in the following way. Given an election (C, V ), if V = 1, C ≥ 1 and the candidates in C listed in increasing lexicographic order are c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c ℓ , and c 0 encodes a boolean formula ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ ), then do the following. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set x i to true if the lowest-order bit of c i is 1 and otherwise set x i to false. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set x ℓ+i to true if the voter states c i > c 0 and otherwise set x ℓ+i to false. If this is a satisfying assignment for ψ then everyone wins. In all other cases everyone loses. That completes the specification of E.
Clearly E has a p-time winner problem, and by Theorem 4
We construct an instance of E-CCAC-CF in the following way. Let the candidate set C consist of p encoding the boolean formula ψ, and let there be zero nonmanipulators and one manipulator. Let the set of unregistered candidates contain ℓ pairs where for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there is a candidate p · i binary · 0 and a candidate p · i binary · 1. (where · denotes concatenation and i binary denotes i encoded in binary). Let the add limit k = 2ℓ. 6 If
the chair adds the candidate, call it c i , from the ith pair whose last bit corresponds to the value of x i in this assignment. Note that p, c 1 , . . . , c ℓ are in increasing lexicographic order. Then no matter what assignment to x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ is induced by the manipulator's vote, formula ψ is satisfied and so p will win.
Conversely, if the chair makes p a winner, then the chair adds exactly ℓ candidates whose lowest-order bits give an assignment to
Specific Systems
Plurality is certainly the most important of election systems, and approval is also an important system. For plurality, approval, and Condorcet elections, we will show that all the "M+," "CF," and "MF" cases whose control type is classified as P (i.e., as a "V" or "I" in the notation of that of the 2007 table we are about to mention) in the with-no-manipulators table of complexities for that election system in [HHR07] are in P for all our cooperative and competitive cases.
Theorem 4.4 Each problem contained in
whose corresponding control type is in P in Table 1 of page 258 of [HHR07] , 7 is in P.
The proofs of many of these cases will utilize the polynomial-time algorithms for the without-manipulators versions of the control cases. The well-known polynomial-time results from Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] and Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07] are both for the unique-winner model. Observation 4.5 states that each of these control cases holds for the nonunique-winner model, and we will reference this observation when referring to the polynomial-time algorithm for a given nonmanipulator control case. (Some of these cases were observed in [FHH14a] and [HHR12b] .)
As an illustration, we present the proof of plurality-M+CCPV-TE ∈ P here. The proofs of the remaining cases of Theorem 4.4 can be found in Appendix B. Proof. Note that it is not the case that the manipulators can always simply vote for p, no matter what the chair does. For example, if the chair partitions the voters such that one of the subelections contains a voter voting p > a > b, and the other subelection contains 100 voters voting a > b > p, 101 voters voting b > a > p, and one manipulator, the manipulator should vote for a, so that a and b are tied in the second subelection and neither goes through to the second round. Still, we will show that if a partition of the voters and a manipulation of the manipulators exist such that p wins the election, then there exists a way for p to win when all manipulators vote for p. It follows that we can check if p can be made a winner by first having all manipulators vote for p and then running the polynomial-time algorithm for plurality-CCPV-TE from [HHR07] (modified in the obvious way for the nonunique-winner case).
So, suppose that a manipulation and a partition (V 1 , V 2 ) exist such that p is a winner of the election. Without loss of generality, suppose p is the unique winner of (C, V 1 ). Then p is also the unique winner of (C, V 1 ) if all manipulators in V 1 vote for p, so have all manipulators in V 1 vote for p. Now consider (C, V 2 ). As explained in the previous paragraph, simply changing the manipulators' votes to p could have bad effects. Instead, we do the following. While manipulators remain in V 2 whose first-choice candidate is not p, choose one of them, v, let a be v's first-choice candidate, and do the following.
1.
Change v's vote from a to p and move v to V 1 . 7 This claim holds despite the fact that that table is focused on the unique-winner case, and despite the fact that the "AC" line of that table refers to so-called unlimited adding and in this paper (as is now standard) we use "AC" to refer to (limited) adding. The reason we have looked at only the P cases of the 2007 table is that due to our inheritance results, for the NP cases, getting a P result will be impossible, since by Observation 4.5 the unique-winner results of the table carry over to our nonunique-winner setting. 
For each
and if it is a manipulator, change its vote to p.
Since in each iteration of the above loop we add at least one vote for p to V 1 , p will remain the unique winner of (C, V 1 ). If after the loop (C, V 2 ) does not have a unique winner or has p as the unique winner it is immediate that p wins the runoff. The only remaining case is that after the loop (C, V 2 ) has a unique winner c = p. Note that in each iteration we keep the same set of winners in (C, V 2 ) unless V 2 becomes empty in which case all candidates become winners in (C, V 2 ). This implies that c is the unique winner of (C, V 2 ) before the loop and thus c does not beat p in the runoff before the loop. Since the only votes that are changed in the loop are manipulator votes changed to p, after the loop p clearly is a winner of the runoff. 8 ❑ Below we state a general result on election systems satisfying the unique version of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (unique-WARP). An election system satisfies unique-WARP if when a candidate is the unique winner among a set of candidates, that candidate is the unique winner among every subset of candidates that includes him or her. It is easy to see that approval and Condorcet elections satisfy unique-WARP [HHR07] . Proof. Given an election system satisfying unique-WARP, an election (C, V ), and a candidate p ∈ C, we do the following.
For each of CCPC-TE and CCRPC-TE, if p is an overall winner using partition (C − {p}, {p}) then clearly control is possible.
Conversely, for each of CCPC-TE and CCRPC-TE, if p is not an overall winner using partition (C − {p}, {p}) then we will show that control is not possible.
Since p is not an overall winner, there exists a candidate r ∈ C − {p} that is the unique winner of (C − {p}, V ) and beats p pairwise. Since we know that the given election system satisfies unique-WARP, r will be the unique winner of every subelection that does not involve p, and p is not a unique winner of any subelection involving r. Thus it is clear to see that control is not possible. ❑ Corollary 4.7 For an election system E, satisfying unique-WARP, E-CCPC-TE = E-CCRPC-TE.
We now give results for veto and Borda, including, for the latter, an interesting increase in complexity.
In weighted elections every voter has a positive integer weight, and a voter with weight w counts as w voters. In weighted voter control cases, the addition/deletion limit still pertains to the number of voters that can be added or deleted. Consider the case of 3-candidate weighted veto elections. The known results on this are that constructive coalitional manipulation is NP-complete [CSL07] , destructive coalitional manipulation is in P [CSL07] , and CCAV and CCDV are both in P [FHH15]. The following results, whose second part may at first glance be surprising, shows that for this system CC A D V-CF MF are all in P-not NP-complete.
Theorem 4.8 For 3-candidate weighted veto elections, the following hold.
Proof. The first case follows directly from the fact that constructive manipulation is NP-complete [CSL07] and the inheritance observations from Section 4.1 (as the relevant result there holds even for the weighted case). For the competitive cases, note that the only action that makes sense for the manipulators is to veto p. This holds regardless of whether the manipulators or the chair goes first. So, we let the manipulators veto p and then run the polynomial-time algorithm for CCAV and CCDV from [FHH15]. ❑ 3-candidate weighted Borda elections show a true increase in complexity. The known results for this system are that constructive coalitional manipulation is NP-complete [CSL07] , destructive coalitional manipulation is in P [CSL07] , and CCAV and CCDV are both NPcomplete [FHH15] and thus all these problems are in NP. Yet we show that CCAV-MF is coNP-hard, and so cannot be in NP unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to NP∩coNP.
Theorem 4.9 For 3-candidate weighted Borda elections, the following hold.
Proof.
The first case follows directly from the fact that manipulation is NPcomplete [CSL07] and the inheritance observations from Section 4.1.
The remaining NP-hardness results follow from the NP-completeness of CCAV and CCDV and the inheritance observations from Section 4.1.
To show that CCAV-CF is in NP, guess a set of voters to add, and then check that the manipulators can't make p not win. We do this by setting all manipulators to a > b > p, checking that p is a winner, and then setting all manipulators to b > a > p, and checking that p is a winner. A similar argument shows that CCDV-CF is in NP.
It remains to show that CCAV-MF is coNP-hard, i.e., that the complement of CCAV-MF is NP-hard. We will reduce from Partition. Given a nonempty sequence of positive integers k 1 , . . . , k t that sums to 2K, we will construct an election such that there is a partition (i.e., a subsequence of k 1 , . . . , k t that sums to K) if and only if the manipulators can vote in such a way that the chair won't be able to make p a winner.
We construct the following election: We have manipulators with weights k 1 , . . . , k t . The manipulators are registered voters. We have two unregistered voters, both with weight 3K − 1. One of these voters votes p > a > b and one votes p > b > a. We have addition limit one, i.e., the chair can add at most one voter.
If there is a partition, then the manipulators vote so that a total of K vote weight casts the vote a > b > p and a total of K vote weight casts the vote b > a > p. So, the scores of p, a, and b are 0, 3K, and 3K. There is no way for the chair to make p a winner by adding at most one voter. If the chair adds the weight 3K − 1 voter voting p > a > b, the score of p is 6K − 2 and the score of a is 3K + (3K − 1) = 6K − 1 and so p is not a winner. Adding the other voter gives a score of 6K − 2 for p and a score of 6K − 1 for b and again p is not a winner.
Now consider the case that there is no partition. Look at the scores of the candidates after the manipulators have voted. Without loss of generality, assume that score(a) ≤ score(b). Then score(a) ≤ 3K − 1 (since there is no partition) and score(b) ≤ 4K. Now the chair adds the weight 3K − 1 voter voting p > a > b. After adding that voter, p's score is 6K − 2, a's score is at most (3K − 1) + (3K − 1) and b's score is at most 4K. It follows that p is a winner. ❑
Conclusions and Open Directions
We have established general inheritance results and complexity upper bounds for control in the presence of manipulators, for both cooperative and competitive settings. We for the upper bounds provided matching lower bounds, but also showed that for many natural systems the complexity is far lower than the general upper bounds. Many open directions remain. For example, regarding 3-candidate weighted Borda elections, we have shown that CCAV-MF is NP-hard and coNP-hard, and although our upperbound theorem is not explicitly about weighted cases, clearly this problem, for exactly the same reason as in our upper-bound theorem, is in coNP NP . But precisely where within that range does it fall? Also, what happens for real-world election systems that themselves are complex to manipulate and/or control, such as Llull, Copeland, fallback, sincere-preference approval, and Schulze elections? Do some of these systems themselves provide natural systems that might for our competitive cases be complete for some of the high complexity classes given in Table 1 
Let E ′ be defined as E in Theorem 4.3 except replace "everyone loses" with "everyone wins" and "everyone wins" with "everyone loses."
Note that for every election (C, V ) and every candidate p ∈ C, p is an E winner of (C, V ) if and only if p is not an E ′ winner of (C, V ). This immediately implies that Proof. Let E be defined in the following way. Given an election (C, V ), if C ≥ 3 and the candidates in C listed in increasing lexicographic order are c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c ℓ+1 , candidate c 0 encodes a boolean formula ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ ), V = 2ℓ + 1, and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ there are at least two voters with the same vote who rank c i first, then do the following. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set x i to true if two voters with c i first both state c ℓ+1 > c 0 and otherwise set x i to false. Let v be the unique vote that occurs three times or only once in V . For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set x ℓ+i to true if v states c i > c 0 , else set x ℓ+i to false. If this is a satisfying assignment for ψ then everyone wins. In all other cases everyone loses. That completes the specification of E. Clearly E has a p-time winner problem, and by Theorem 4.1 we know that E-CCAV-CF is in NP NP . So what is left is to show that E-CCAV-CF is NP NP -hard.
Let (∃x 1 , . . . , x ℓ )(∀x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )] be an instance of QBF 2 . We construct an instance of E-CCAV-CF in the following way. Let the candidate set C consist of p encoding ψ and ℓ + 1 candidates all lexicographically larger than p. So, the candidates in C can be listed in increasing lexicographic order as p, c 1 , . . . , c ℓ+1 . Let the collection of registered voters V consist of zero nonmanipulators and one manipulator. Let the collection of unregistered voters, all nonmanipulators, consist of 2ℓ pairs where for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there are two voters v i and v ′ i with the same vote c i > c ℓ+1 > p > · · · and two voters u i and u ′ i with the same vote c i > p > c ℓ+1 > · · · . Let the add limit k = 4ℓ and let the preferred candidate of the chair be p ∈ C.
If (∃x 1 , . . . , x ℓ )(∀x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )] ∈ QBF 2 , fix an assignment to x 1 , . . . , x ℓ such that (∀x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )] is true. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, if x i is true in the assignment the chair adds v i and v ′ i and if x i is false the chair adds u i and u ′ i . Note that the vote of the manipulator will be the unique vote v that occurs three times (if the manipulator votes the same as one of the paired voters) or only once. And no matter what assignment to x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ is induced by v, formula ψ is satisfied and so p will win.
Conversely, if the chair makes p a winner then the chair adds exactly ℓ voter pairs whose ℓ different votes give an assignment to x 1 , . . . , x ℓ such that (∀x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )] is true. Proof. Let E ′ be defined as E in Theorem A.5 except replace "everyone loses" with "everyone wins" and "everyone wins" with "everyone loses." Note that for every election (C, V ) and every candidate p ∈ C, p is an E winner of (C, V ) if and only if p is not an E ′ winner of (C, V ). This immediately implies that E ′ -DCAV-CF = E-CCAV-CF and E ′ -DCAV-MF = E-CCAV-MF. The result follows from Theorems A.5 and A.6. ❑ Unlike in the candidate cases, we can not use the same construction to show that the deleting voter cases are also hard, because the chair can delete the manipulator. In fact, we will show that for every election system E with a p-time winner problem, E-CCDV-CF and E-DCDV-CF are in coDP (and so are not NP NP -complete unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses). DP is the class of languages that are the difference of two NP languages [PY84]. 
Proof.
It is easy to see that it is always at least as good for the chair to delete a manipulator as it is to delete a nonmanipulator (though note that because the election system can be anything, deleting as many manipulators as possible may not be best; for example, if we want to make p a winner and our election systems has all candidates as winners if there are four voters and no winners if there are fewer voters, we do not want to delete manipulators if there are four voters). So we have that p can be made a winner (not a winner) by deleting at most k voters if and only if there exists a k ′ ≤ k such that (letting m be the number of manipulators):
1. k ′ ≤ m and after deleting k ′ manipulators the remaining m − k ′ manipulators can not preclude p from winning (not winning), or 2. k ′ > m and after deleting all manipulators the chair can make p win (not win) by deleting at most k ′ − m voters.
We can check if there exists a k ′ such that we are in case 1 in coNP and we can check if there exists a k ′ such that we are in case 2 in NP, and so we can write our languages as the union of a coNP set and an NP set. ❑
We now show that the coDP bounds from Theorem A.8 are tight.
Theorem A.9 There exists an election system, E, with a p-time winner problem, such that E-CCDV-CF is coDP-complete.
Proof. We reduce from the coDP-complete problem { φ, ψ | φ ∈ SAT or ψ ∈ SAT}, which is the complement of the standard DP-complete problem SAT-UNSAT [PY84]. Without loss of generality, we assume that φ and ψ have the same number of variables. Let E be defined in the following way. Given an election (C, V ), if C ≥ 3 and the candidates in C listed in increasing lexicographic order are c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c ℓ+1 , and candidate c 0 encodes the pair of boolean formulas φ(x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ), ψ(x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ ) , then:
1. If V = ℓ and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there is a voter who ranks c i first, we do the following. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set x i to true if the voter with c i first states c ℓ+1 > c 0 and otherwise set x i to false. If this is a satisfying assignment for φ, then everyone wins.
2. If V = 2ℓ + 1, then if there are no voters that rank c ℓ+1 first, then everyone wins. Otherwise, if there is exactly one voter v that ranks c ℓ+1 first then for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set x ℓ+i to true if v states c i > c 0 , else set x ℓ+i to false. If this is not a satisfying assignment for ψ, then everyone wins.
In all other cases everyone loses. That completes the specification of E. Clearly E has a p-time winner problem, and by Theorem A.8 we know that E-CCDV-CF is in coDP. So what is left is to show that E-CCDV-MF is coDP-hard.
Let φ(x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ), ψ(x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ ) be a pair of boolean formulas. We construct an instance of E-CCDV-CF in the following way. Let the candidate set C consist of p encoding φ, ψ and ℓ + 1 candidates all lexicographically larger than p. So, the candidates in C can be listed in increasing lexicographic order as p, c 1 , . . . , c ℓ+1 . Let the collection of voters V consist of one manipulator and 2ℓ nonmanipulators where for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there is a voter v i who votes c i > c ℓ+1 > p > · · · and a voter u i who votes c i > p > c ℓ+1 > · · · . Let the delete limit k = 2ℓ + 1 (any limit ≥ ℓ + 1 will do) and let the preferred candidate of the chair be p ∈ C. We need to show that (φ ∈ SAT or ψ ∈ SAT) if and only if control can be asserted.
Suppose φ ∈ SAT. Fix an assignment to x 1 , . . . , x ℓ that satisfies φ. The chair deletes ℓ + 1 voters. The only voters that are not deleted are for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, v i if x i is true in the assignment and u i if x i is false in the assignment. This leaves ℓ voters that encode a satisfying assignment for φ and so everyone wins. Next suppose that ψ ∈ SAT. Then we keep all voters. Since there does not exist a satisfying assignment for ψ, everyone wins.
For the converse, to have p win, we either have that V = ℓ, in which case φ is satisfiable, or V = 2ℓ + 1. In the latter case, if ψ ∈ SAT the manipulator could induce a satisfying assignment for ψ, but then p is not a winner. It follows that ψ ∈ SAT. ❑ Theorem A.10 There exists an election system, E ′ , with a p-time winner problem, such that E-DCDV-CF is coDP-complete.
Proof. Let E ′ be defined as E in Theorem A.9 except replace "everyone loses" with "everyone wins" and "everyone wins" with "everyone loses." Note that for every election (C, V ) and every candidate p ∈ C, p is an E winner of (C, V ) if and only if p is not an E ′ winner of (C, V ). This immediately implies that E ′ -DCDV-CF = E-CCDV-CF. The result follows from Theorem A.9. ❑ For the CCDV-MF case, we modify the construction from Theorem A.6 to basically ensure that the manipulator will not be deleted, while still making sure that p can always be made a winner for positive instances of QBF 2 .
Theorem A.11 There exists an election system, E, with a p-time winner problem, such that E-CCDV-MF is coNP NP -complete.
Proof. Let E be defined in the following way. Given an election (C, V ), if C ≥ 3 and the candidates in C listed in increasing lexicographic order are c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c ℓ+1 , candidate c 0 encodes a boolean formula ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ ), V = ℓ + 1, and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there is a voter who ranks c i first, then do the following. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set x i to true if some voter with c i first states c ℓ+1 > c 0 and otherwise set x i to false. If there is a voter v that ranks c ℓ+1 first (note that there exists at most one such voter) then for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set x ℓ+i to true if v states c i > c 0 , else set x ℓ+i to false. If this is a satisfying assignment for ψ then everyone wins. If there is a voter that ranks c 0 first then everyone wins. If there are two voters that rank c i first for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, and these voters agree on whether or not c ℓ+1 > c 0 then everyone wins. In all other cases everyone loses. That completes the specification of E.
Clearly E has a p-time winner problem, and by Theorem 4.1 we know that E-CCDV-MF is in coNP NP . So what is left is to show that E-CCDV-MF is coNP NP -hard.
Let (∀x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )(∃x 1 , . . . , x ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )] be an instance of QBF 2 . We construct an instance of E-CCDV-MF in the following way. Let the candidate set C consist of p encoding ψ and ℓ + 1 candidates all lexicographically larger than p. So, the candidates in C can be listed in increasing lexicographic order as p, c 1 , . . . , c ℓ+1 . Let the collection of voters V consist of one manipulator and 2ℓ nonmanipulators where for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there is a voter v i who votes c i > c ℓ+1 > p > · · · and a voter u i who votes c i > p > c ℓ+1 > · · · . Let the delete limit k = 2ℓ + 1 (any limit ≥ ℓ will do) and let the preferred candidate of the chair be p ∈ C.
Suppose (∀x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )(∃x 1 , . . . , x ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )] ∈ QBF 2 . Consider a vote v for the manipulator. If v ranks c 0 first then the chair deletes v i for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ to make p a winner. If v ranks c i first, for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, and states c ℓ+1 > c 0 , then the chair deletes {u 1 , . . . , u ℓ } to make p a winner. If v ranks c i first, for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, and states c 0 > c ℓ+1 , then the chair deletes {v 1 , . . . , v ℓ } to make p a winner. If v ranks c ℓ+1 first, then consider the assignment to x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ induced by v and fix an assignment to x 1 , . . . , x ℓ such that ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ ) is true. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, if x i is true in the assignment the chair deletes u i and if x i is false the chair deletes v i . This will make p a winner.
Conversely, fix an assignment to x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ . Set the manipulator vote v so that it induces this assignment and so that c ℓ+1 is ranked first. Consider the set of voters left after the chair has deleted voters to make p a winner. Note that this set must include v and a set of voters that induces an assignment to x 1 , . . . , x ℓ that makes ψ true. ❑ Theorem A.12 There exists an election system, E ′ , with a p-time winner problem, such that E ′ -DCDV-MF is coNP NP -complete.
Proof. Let E ′ be defined as E in Theorem A.9 except replace "everyone loses" with "everyone wins" and "everyone wins" with "everyone loses." Note that for every election (C, V ) and every candidate p ∈ C, p is an E winner of (C, V ) if and only if p is not an E ′ winner of (C, V ). This immediately implies that E ′ -DCDV-MF = E-CCDV-MF. The result follows from Theorem A.11. ❑ Theorem A.13 There exists an election system E, with a p-time winner problem, such that E-CCPV-TE TP -∅ revoting -CF are each NP NP -complete.
Proof. Let E be defined in the following way. Given an election (C, V ), do the following. If C = 1 then the sole candidate wins. If C = 2 then the lexicographically larger candidate wins. If C ≥ 3, V = 2ℓ, the candidates in C listed in increasing lexicographic order are c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c ℓ+1 , and candidate c 0 encodes a boolean formula ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ ), then if for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there are exactly two voters with the same vote who rank c i first no one wins, else c ℓ+1 wins.
If C ≥ 3, V = 2ℓ + 1, the candidates in C listed in increasing lexicographic order are c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c ℓ+1 , candidate c 0 encodes a boolean formula ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ ), and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there are at least two voters with the same vote who rank c i first, then do the following. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set x i to true if two voters with c i first both state c ℓ+1 > c 0 and otherwise set x i to false. Let v be the unique vote that occurs three times or only once in V . For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set x ℓ+i to true if v states c i > c 0 , else set x ℓ+i to false. If this is a satisfying assignment for ψ then c 0 wins.
In all other cases, everyone loses. That completes the specification of E. Clearly E has a p-time winner problem, and E-CCPV-TE TP - Let (∃x 1 , . . . , x ℓ )(∀x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )] be an instance of QBF 2 . We construct an instance of E-CCPV-TE-CF in the following way. Let the candidate set C consist of p encoding ψ and ℓ+1 candidates lexicographically larger than p. So, the candidates in C can be listed in increasing lexicographic order as p, c 1 , . . . , c ℓ+1 . Let there be one manipulative voter, and let the nonmanipulators consist of 2ℓ pairs where for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there are two voters v i and v ′ i with the same vote c i > c ℓ+1 > p > · · · and two voters u i and u ′ i with the same vote c i > p > c ℓ+1 > · · · . Let the preferred candidate of the chair be p ∈ C.
If (∃x 1 , . . . , x ℓ )(∀x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )] ∈ QBF 2 , fix an assignment to x 1 , . . . , x ℓ such that (∀x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )] is true. The chair sets V 1 to consist of the manipulator and the subcollection of the voters whose votes encode the assignment, i.e., for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, if x i is true in the assignment the chair adds v i and v ′ i to V 1 and if x i is false the chair adds u i and u ′ i to V 1 . The chair puts the remaining voters from V into V 2 . Note that the vote of the manipulator will be the unique vote v that occurs three times (if the manipulator votes for one of the paired voters) or only once in V 1 . And no matter what assignment to x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ is induced by v, formula ψ is satisfied and so p is the unique winner of (C, V 1 ). Since V 2 consists 2ℓ voters of the correct form, no one wins (C, V 2 ). Only candidate p participates in the runoff and so p wins the runoff. Note that this argument works for the "TE" and the "TP" models with or without revoting.
Conversely, if the chair can ensure that p wins then there exists a partition such that for all manipulations p wins. It is clear that the chair must partition the voters into (V 1 , V 2 ) such that V 1 = 2ℓ + 1 and V 2 = 2ℓ, since otherwise there are no winners. Also, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, V 2 contains exactly two voters with the same vote who rank c i first. It follows that V 1 contains the manipulator vote v and that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, V 1 contains exactly two nonmanipulators with the same vote who rank c i first. These 2ℓ nonmanipulators induce an assignment to x 1 , . . . , x ℓ . Fix this assignment. Now fix an assignment to x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ . Set the manipulator vote v so that it induces this assignment. Since p wins the runoff, this is a satisfying assignment for ψ. It follows that for the assignment to x 1 , . . . , x ℓ that is induced by V 1 , it holds that (∀x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )] is true ❑ Theorem A.14 There exists an election system E, with a p-time winner problem, such that E-CCPV-TE TP -MF and E-CCPV-TE-MF-revoting are each coNP NP -complete.
Let E be as defined in the proof of Theorem A.13. Then E has a ptime winner problem and by Theorem 4.1 we know that E-CCPV-TE TP -MF and E-CCPV-TE-MF-revoting are each in coNP NP .
So what is left is to show that E-CCPV-TE TP -MF and E-CCPV-TE-MF-revoting are each coNP NP -hard. Below we describe the reduction for the "TE" case. It is easy to see that the same reduction holds for the "TP" case. For the "TE" case with revoting observe that the same reduction also holds since in the runoff there will be at most two candidates and in election system E the votes do not affect who wins in that case.
Let (∀x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )(∃x 1 , . . . , x ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )] be an instance of QBF 2 . Our instance of E-CCPV-TE-MF is exactly the instance of E-CCPV-TE-CF from the proof of Theorem A.13. Note that the vote of the manipulator will always be the unique vote v that occurs three times or only once in V . The same argument as in the proof of Theorem A.13 shows that (∀x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )(∃x 1 , . . . , x ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )] ∈ QBF 2 if and only if the chair can ensure that p always becomes a winner by partitioning voters. ❑ When revoting is allowed after the first round in the TP case, and the manipulators go first, we find an interesting rise in complexity.
Theorem A.15 There exists an election system E, with a p-time winner problem, such that E-CCPV-TP-MF-revoting is coNP NP NP -complete.
Proof. The election system, E, defined below will utilize the following special candidates. 1, ψ : where ψ is a boolean formula, which we refer to as a type-1 candidate.
2, i, j : where i ∈ N and j ∈ {0, 1}, which we refer to as a type-2 candidate.
3, i, j : where i ∈ N and j ∈ {0, 1}, which we refer to as a type-3 candidate. 4, i : where i ∈ N, which we refer to as a type-4 candidate.
Let E be defined in the following way. Given an election (C, V ):
If C consists of one type-1 candidate encoding ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 3ℓ ), 2ℓ type-2 candidates 2, 1, 0 , 2, 1, 1 , . . . , 2, ℓ, 0 , 2, ℓ, 1 , 2ℓ type-3 candidates 3, 1, 0 , 3, 1, 1 , . . . , 3, ℓ, 0 , 3, ℓ, 1 , and ℓ + 2 type-4 candidates 4, 1 , . . . , 4, ℓ + 2 , then do the following.
• If V = 2ℓ + 1 and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there are at least two voters with the same vote who rank 4, i first, then we have 3ℓ + 2 winners consisting of 1, ψ , 4, 1 , . . . , 4, ℓ + 1 , and 2ℓ candidates determined in the following way. Let v be the unique vote that occurs three times or only once in V . For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, 2, i, 1 is a winner if v states 4, i > 1, ψ and otherwise 2, i, 0 is a winner. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, 3, i, 1 is a winner if two voters who rank 4, i first both state 4, ℓ + 1 > 1, ψ and otherwise 3, i, 0 is a winner.
• If V = 2ℓ then if for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there are at least two voters with the same vote who rank 4, i first, no one wins, else 4, ℓ + 2 wins.
If C consists of one type-1 candidate encoding ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 3ℓ ), ℓ type-2 candidates of the form 2, 1, ⋆ , . . . , 2, ℓ, ⋆ (where ⋆ ∈ {0, 1}), ℓ type-3 candidates of the form 3, 1, ⋆ , . . . , 3, ℓ, ⋆ (where ⋆ ∈ {0, 1}), and ℓ + 1 type-4 candidates 4, 1 , . . . , 4, ℓ + 1 , V = 4ℓ + 1, and there is a unique vote v ′ that occurs three times or only once in V , then do the following. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set x i to true if 2, i, 1 is in C and to false if 2, i, 0 is in C, set x ℓ+i to true if 3, i, 1 is in C and to false if 3, i, 0 is in C, and set x 2ℓ+i to true if v ′ states 4, i > 1, ψ and else set x 2ℓ+i to false. If this is a satisfying assignment for formula ψ, then 1, ψ wins. Otherwise, everyone loses.
Else, everyone loses. That completes the specification of E.
Clearly E has a p-time winner problem, and E-CCPV-TP-MF-revoting is in coNP NP NP by Theorem 4.1. So, what is left to show is that E-CCPV-TP-MF-revoting is coNP NP NPhard.
Let (∀x 1 , . . . , x ℓ )(∃x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )(∀x 2ℓ+1 , . . . , x 3ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 3ℓ )] be an instance of QBF 3 .
We construct an instance of E-CCPV-TP-MF-revoting in the following way.
Let the candidate set C consist of one type-1 candidate encoding ψ, 2ℓ type-2 candidates 2, 1, 0 , 2, 1, 1 , . . . , 2, ℓ, 0 , 2, ℓ, 1 , 2ℓ type-3 candidates 3, 1, 0 , 3, 1, 1 , . . . , 3, ℓ, 0 , 3, ℓ, 1 , and ℓ + 2 type-4 candidates 4, 1 , . . . , 4, ℓ + 2 . Let there be one manipulator and 4ℓ nonmanipulators where for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there are two voters v i and v ′ i with the same vote 4, i > 4, ℓ + 1 > 1, ψ > · · · and two voters u i and u ′ i with the same vote 4, i > 1, ψ > 4, ℓ + 1 > · · · . Let the preferred candidate of the chair be 1, ψ ∈ C.
Suppose (∀x 1 , . . . , x ℓ )(∃x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )(∀x 2ℓ+1 , . . . , x 3ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 3ℓ )] ∈ QBF 3 . Consider a first-round vote v for the manipulator, and view it as an assignment to x 1 , . . . , x ℓ where for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, if v states 4, i > 1, ψ then x i is true and otherwise x i is false. Using this assignment, set an assignment to x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ such that (∀x 2ℓ+1 , . . . , x 3ℓ )ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 3ℓ ) is true. The chair sets V 1 to consist of the manipulator and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, if x ℓ+i is true in the assignment the chair adds v i and v ′ i to V 1 and if x ℓ+i is false the chair adds u i and u ′ i to V 1 . The chair puts the remaining voters from V into V 2 . Note that v will be the unique vote that occurs three times or only once in V 1 . Notice that the type-2 and type-3 candidates that proceed to the runoff "hold" the abovementioned assignments to x 1 , . . . , x ℓ and x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ respectively (since 2, i, 1 proceeds to the runoff if and only if x i is true, 2, i, 0 proceeds to the runoff if and only if x i is false, 3, i, 1 proceeds to the runoff if and only if x ℓ+i is true, and 3, i, 0 proceeds to the runoff if and only if x ℓ+i is false). And that no matter what assignment to x 2ℓ+1 , . . . , x 3ℓ is induced by the second-round vote v ′ of the manipulator, formula ψ is true and so 1, ψ wins.
Conversely, suppose that for all first-round manipulator votes there exists a partition such that for all second-round manipulator votes 1, ψ wins. Fix a first-round manipulator vote v, and let (V 1 , V 2 ) be a partition such that 1, ψ wins regardless of the second-round vote of the manipulator. It is clear that V 1 = 2ℓ + 1 and V 2 = 2ℓ (without loss of generality), and that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, V 2 contains exactly two voters with the same vote who rank 4, i first. It follows that the first-round manipulator vote v is the unique vote that occurs three times or only once in V 1 and that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, V 1 contains two voters with the same vote who rank 4, i first.
Fix an assignment to x 1 , . . . , x ℓ and consider the first-round manipulator vote v where for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, if x i is true then v states 4, i > 1, ψ and so 2, i, 1 proceeds to the runoff, and if x i is false then v states 1, ψ > 4, i and so 2, i, 0 proceeds to the runoff. Since we know that there exists a partition (V 1 , V 2 ) where 1, ψ wins the runoff, we know that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, 3, i, 1 proceeds to the runoff if v i and v ′ i are in V 1 and otherwise 3, i, 0 does. We can view this as an assignment to x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ where for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, if 3, i, 1 proceeds to the runoff then x i is true and if 3, i, 0 proceeds to the runoff then x i is false. Now fix an assignment to x 2ℓ+1 , . . . , x 3ℓ and set the second-round manipulator vote v ′ so that it induces this assignment. Since 1, ψ wins the runoff, ψ is true for the assignment to x 1 , . . . , x ℓ , x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ , x 2ℓ+1 , . . . , x 3ℓ . It follows that (∀x 1 , . . . , x ℓ )(∃x ℓ+1 , . . . , x 2ℓ )(∀x 2ℓ+1 , . . . , x 3ℓ )[ψ(x 1 , . . . , x 3ℓ )] ∈ QBF 3 . ❑
B Specific Systems
In some of the proofs in this section, we use the notation score (C,V ) (a) to denote the score of candidate a in election (C, V ). When it is clear from context, we may leave out C, V , or both.
B.1 Plurality
Theorem B.1 For plurality elections, the following hold.
Proof. For the constructive cooperative and the destructive competitive cases it is clear that the manipulators should all vote for p. For the destructive cooperative and the constructive competitive cases the optimal action for the manipulators is to all vote for the same highest-scoring candidate in C − {p}.
In all cases we can determine if the chair can be successful by assuming the manipulators vote as above and using the corresponding p-time algorithm for control from Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] (for the constructive cases) or from Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07] (for the destructive cases), modified in the obvious way for the nonunique-winner case (see Observation 4.5). ❑
For the remaining proofs in this section, given an election (C, V ) containing k manipulators, we say that a candidate r is a rival of p if r can beat p pairwise, i.e., if score {p,r} (r) + k > score {p,r} (p).
Lemma B.2 If there exists a partition such that p is an overall winner in the "TE" model when all manipulators vote for the same highest-scoring rival r and put p last, then there exists a partition such that p is always an overall winner.
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) where V contains k manipulators, a candidate p ∈ C, and a candidate r ∈ C − {p} such that score {p,r} (r) + k > score {p,r} (p), we do the following.
Let (V 1 , V 2 ) be a partition such that p is an overall winner when all manipulators vote for r and put p last. Let k 1 be the number of manipulators in V 1 , let k 2 be the number of manipulators in V 2 , let ℓ 1 be the number of nonmanipulator votes for r in V 1 , and let ℓ 2 be the number of nonmanipulator votes for r in V 2 . Without loss of generality assume that p is the unique winner of (C, V 1 ) when all manipulators vote for r. Now we will construct a new partition ( V 1 , V 2 ) that will work regardless of how the manipulators vote. Let V 2 consist of ℓ 2 nonmanipulator votes for r, score V 2 (p) nonmanipulator votes for p, for every rival r = r, min(ℓ 2 , score( r)) votes for r, for every nonrival c = p all the nonmanipulator votes for c, and k 2 manipulators. Let
We first show that p is always the unique winner of (C, V 1 ). We know that score V 1 (r) + k 1 = ℓ 1 + k 1 < score V 1 (p) = score V 1 (p). For every nonrival c = p, score V 1 (c) + k 1 = k 1 < score V 1 (p). Finally, for every rival r = r, score( r) ≤ score(r) = ℓ 1 + ℓ 2 , and so score V 1 ( r) ≤ ℓ 1 , which implies that score V 1 ( r) + k 1 ≤ ℓ 1 + k 1 < score V 1 (p). It follows that p is always the unique winner of (C, V 1 ).
So the only way in which p can be precluded from winning the runoff is if there exist a manipulation and a rival r of p such that r is the unique winner of (C, V 2 ). Then ℓ 2 + k 2 > score(c) for every nonrival c = p, and ℓ 2 +k 2 > score V 2 (p) = score V 2 (p). Now consider (C, V 2 ) and let all manipulators vote for r. Then the score of r in (C, V 2 ) (after the manipulation) is ℓ 2 + k 2 , and r is the unique winner of (C, V 2 ). Then p is not an overall winner of (C, V ) when all manipulators vote for r, which contradicts our assumption.
It follows that p is always a winner of ( V 1 , V 2 ). ❑ Theorem B.3 plurality-CCPV-TE-CF is in P.
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) and a preferred candidate of the chair p ∈ C, p can be made a winner if and only if there exists a partition (V 1 , V 2 ) such p is always an overall winner. If no rivals of p exist, then clearly control is possible if and only if C = {p} or there is at least one vote for p (in the latter case, let V 1 consist of one voter for p).
Otherwise, let r be a highest-scoring rival of p. It is immediate from Lemma B.2 that control is possible if and only if there exists a partition such that p wins when all manipulators vote for r and put p last. This can be determined by running the polynomialtime algorithm for plurality-CCPV-TE from [HHR07] , modified in the obvious way for the nonunique-winner case (see Observation 4.5). ❑ Theorem B.4 plurality-CCPV-TE-CF = plurality-CCPV-TE-MF.
Proof.
It immediately follows from the definition that plurality-CCPV-TE-CF ⊆ plurality-CCPV-TE-MF. Now suppose that "MF" control is possible. Then for all manipulations there exists a partition such that the preferred candidate p wins. Then either no rival to p exists, in which case "CF" control is possible since either p is the only candidate or there exists at least one vote for p. When a rival r to p exists, control is certainly possible when all the manipulators vote for r and put p last. By Lemma B.2 we know that then there exists a partition where p is always a winner, so "CF" control is possible. ❑ Corollary B.5 plurality-CCPV-TE-MF is in P.
Theorem B.6 plurality-M+DCPV-TE is in P.
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) and a despised candidate of the chair p ∈ C, we can determine in polynomial time if p can be precluded from winning by partitioning voters as follows. If there are no manipulators, run the polynomial-time algorithm for plurality-DCPV-TE from [HHR07] , modified in the obvious way for the nonunique-winner case (see Observation 4.5). So, let k > 0 denote the number of manipulators in V . If there exists a rival r to p (i.e., a candidate that can beat p pairwise, i.e., a candidate for which score {p,r} (p) < score {p,r} (r) + k), then control is possible: Let V 2 consist of one manipulator and let all manipulators vote for r.
If there are no rivals, we must ensure that p doesn't make it to the runoff. It is easy to see that this can be done if and only if we are in one of the following two cases. ❑ Lemma B.7 If there exists a partition of voters such that p is not a plurality winner in the "TE" model when all manipulators vote for p, then there exists a partition such that p can never be made a plurality winner by the manipulators.
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) and a candidate p ∈ C, we do the following. Let (V 1 , V 2 ) be a partition such that p is not a winner when all manipulators vote for p. If p can never be made a winner by the manipulators in this partition then we are done. So, suppose there exists a manipulation such that p is an overall winner (with the partition (V 1 , V 2 )). Without loss of generality assume that p is the unique winner of (C, V 1 ). Then p is also the unique winner in (C, V 1 ) if all manipulators vote for p. However, since p is not an overall winner if all manipulators vote for p there is a candidate c = p such that if all manipulators vote for p, c is the unique winner of (C, V 2 ) and c is the unique winner of the runoff ({p, c}, V ). Now move all manipulators from V 2 to V 1 . Note that c remains the unique winner of (C, V 2 ) and that c is always the unique winner of ({p, c}, V ). It follows that in this new partition, p is never a winner, no matter what the manipulators do. ❑ Lemma B.7 implies that plurality-DCPV-TE-CF is in P, since control is possible if and only if control is possible when all manipulators vote for p. This can be checked using the polynomial-time algorithm for plurality-DCPV-TE from Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07] , modified in the obvious way for the nonunique-winner case (see Observation 4.5).
Theorem B.8 plurality-DCPV-TE-CF is in P.
We will now show that Lemma B.7 also implies that plurality-DCPV-TE-MF is in P.
Theorem B.9 plurality-DCPV-TE-MF is in P.
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) and a despised candidate of the chair p ∈ C, we will show that we can determine in polynomial time if p can be precluded from winning by partitioning voters.
As in the "CF" case we will use Lemma B.7 to show that control is possible if and only if there exists a partition such that p is precluded from winning when all manipulators vote for p. This also implies that plurality-DCPV-TE-CF = plurality-DCPV-TE-MF.
It immediately follows from the definition that if the instance of plurality-DCPV-TE-MF is positive, then there exists a partition such that p is not a winner when all manipulators vote for p.
For the other direction, by Lemma B.7 if there exists a partition such that p is not a winner when all the manipulators vote for p, then there exists a partition (V 1 , V 2 ) such that p can never be made a winner by the manipulators. This implies that no matter what the manipulators do, there exists a partition (in fact, always the same partition) such that p is not a winner. This then implies that the instance of plurality-DCPV-TE-MF is positive. ❑
B.2 Condorcet
Theorem B.10 For Condorcet elections, the following hold.
DC
Proof. For the constructive cooperative and the destructive competitive cases it is clear that the manipulators should all vote for p.
For the destructive cooperative and the constructive competitive cases the optimal action for the manipulators is to rank p last.
We now prove the Condorcet partition cases. Since Condorcet winners are always unique, the "TE" and "TP" cases coincide and so we will leave out this notation, following [HHR07] .
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) and a preferred candidate of the chair p ∈ C, we can determine in polynomial time if p can be made a winner by partitioning of candidates and by runoff partitioning of candidates as follows.
For the constructive cases we do the following. Since Condorcet elections satisfy unique-WARP, we know from Theorem 4.6 that control is possible if and only if control is possible using partition (C − {p}, {p}). Set all manipulators to rank p first. Rank the candidates that do not beat p pairwise next in all manipulator votes (in any order). Then, as long as there exists an unranked candidate c that can never be a Condorcet winner in (C − {p}, V ), rank c next in all manipulator votes.
Let C be the set of candidates not yet ranked by the manipulators. Notice that every c ∈ C beats p pairwise, and every c ∈ C can become a Condorcet winner in ( C, V ) (and thus also in (C, V )).
So, to determine if control is possible, we must determine if the manipulators can vote in such a way that there is no Condorcet winner in ( C, V ), i.e., ∀c ∈ C ∃c ′ ∈ C such that c ′ ties-or-beats c pairwise.
For V even, assume that there are at least two candidates in C and for V odd, assume there are at least three candidates in C (otherwise there will always be Condorcet winners). We have the following cases, depending on whether or not there is a Condorcet winner in ( C, V ) before the manipulators vote and depending on the parity of V . Let k ≥ 1 denote the number of manipulators in V . 3. If there is no Condorcet winner and V is even, then have ⌊k/2⌋ manipulators vote C (i.e., the candidates in C in some fixed order) and ⌊k/2⌋ manipulators vote ← − C (i.e., the candidates in C in reverse order). When k is odd, let the remaining manipulator vote arbitrarily. It is clear that no Condorcet winners are created by the manipulators.
4. If there is no Condorcet winner and V is odd, then we have the following cases.
(a) If k is even, then have k/2 manipulators vote C and the remaining k/2 manipu- For the destructive cases, since Condorcet elections satisfy unique-WARP, the chair cannot, by partitioning of candidates or by runoff partitioning of candidates, cause a candidate that is a unique winner to no longer be a unique winner [HHR07] . This implies that control is possible if and only if the manipulators can vote so that p is not a winner in (C, V ). It is immediate that the optimal action for the manipulators is to put p last. ❑ Theorem B.12 Condorcet-C D C PC RPC -CF MF are each in P.
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) and a preferred candidate of the chair p ∈ C, we can determine in polynomial time if p can be made a winner by partitioning candidates and by runoff partitioning of candidates as follows. For the constructive cases, since Condorcet elections satisfy unique-WARP, we know from Theorem 4.6 that control is possible if and only if control is possible using partition (C − {p}, {p}). The manipulators can preclude p from winning if and only if there is a candidate c = p that can be made to uniquely win using partition (C − {p}, {p}). This can easily be checked by having all manipulators vote for c.
For the destructive cases, since Condorcet elections satisfy unique-WARP, the chair cannot, by partitioning of candidates or by runoff partitioning of candidates, cause a candidate that is a unique winner to no longer be a unique winner [HHR07] . This implies that control is possible if and only if the manipulators cannot vote so that p becomes a winner in (C, V ). It is immediate that the optimal action for the manipulators is to vote for p. ❑ Theorem B.13 Condorcet-M+DCPV is in P.
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) and a despised candidate of the chair p ∈ C, we can determine in polynomial time if p can be precluded from winning by partitioning voters as follows.
If there exists a candidate r ∈ C − {p} such that when all manipulators rank p last, r beats p pairwise, then control is possible by having all manipulators rank p last and using partition (V, ∅).
If no such candidate exists, the only way to ensure that p is not a winner is to ensure that p does not participate in the runoff. Suppose there exists a partition and a manipulation such that p is not a unique winner of either subelection. If in this partition we set all manipulators to rank p last, p still does not win either subelection. So, we can check whether we are in this case by having all manipulators rank p last, and then use the polynomialtime algorithm for Condorcet-DCPV from [HHR07] , modified in the obvious way for the nonunique-winner case (see Observation 4.5). ❑ Below we state a lemma analogous to Lemma B.7, but for Condorcet elections. The proof follows from a similar argument to the proof of Lemma B.7.
Lemma B.14 If there exists a partition of voters such that p is not a Condorcet winner when all manipulators vote for p, then there exists a partition such that p can never be made a winner by the manipulators.
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) and a candidate p ∈ C, we do the following.
Let (V 1 , V 2 ) be a partition such that p is not a winner when all manipulators vote for p. So, either there exists a candidate r ∈ C − {p} such that r beats p pairwise when all manipulators vote for p, or p is not a unique winner of either subelection.
In the former case the partition (V, ∅) will always work, and in the latter case it is clear to see that there is no way for the manipulators to make p a unique winner of either subelection, so we are done. ❑ Lemma B.14 implies that Condorcet-DCPV-CF is in P, since control is possible if and only if control is possible when all manipulators vote for p. This can be checked using the polynomial-time algorithm from [HHR07] , modified in the obvious way for the nonuniquewinner case (see Observation 4.5).
Theorem B.15 Condorcet-DCPV-CF is in P. Lemma B.14 above also implies that the corresponding "MF" case is also in P. The proof of the following theorem follows from a similar argument as the proof of Theorem B.9.
Theorem B.16 Condorcet-DCPV-MF is in P.
B.3 Approval
Theorem B.17 For approval elections, the following hold.
1. M+ C D C A D C are each in P.
2. M+DC A D V are both in P.
3. C D C A D C-CF MF are each in P.
DC
Proof. For the constructive cooperative and the destructive competitive cases it is clear that the manipulators should all approve of only p.
For the destructive cooperative and the constructive competitive cases the optimal action for the manipulators is approve of all candidates except p.
In all cases we can determine if the chair can be successful by assuming the manipulators vote as above and using the corresponding p-time algorithm for control from Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] (for the constructive cases) or from Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07] (for the destructive cases), modified in the obvious way for the nonunique-winner case (see Observation 4.5). ❑ Theorem B.18 approval-M+ C D C PC RPC -TE TP are each in P.
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) and a preferred candidate of the chair p ∈ C, we can determine in polynomial time if p can be made a winner by partitioning of candidates and by runoff partitioning of candidates as follows. Let k denote the number of manipulators in V . For the constructive "TE" cases we do the following. Since approval elections satisfy unique-WARP, we know from Theorem 4.6 that control is possible if and only if control is possible using partition (C − {p}, {p}). Set all manipulators to approve of p. If that makes p an overall winner of the election, we are done. If not, let c be the unique winner of subelection (C − {p}, V ). Note that after manipulation, c's score is greater than p's score. If for all d ∈ C − {p, c}, score(c) > score(d) + k, c will always be the unique winner of (C − {p}, V ) and so p will never be an overall winner. If there exists a candidate d in C − {p, c} such that score(c) ≤ score(d) + k, let score(c) − score(d) voters approve of d (in addition to p). In this case, (C − {p}, V ) does not have a unique winner and so p is an overall winner.
For the constructive "TP" cases, note that control is possible if and only if the manipulators can vote so that p becomes a winner in (C, V ). So the optimal action for the manipulators is to approve of only p. Similarly, for the destructive cases, control is possible if and only if the manipulators can vote so that p does not win (for the "TP" cases) or does not uniquely win (for the "TE" cases) in (C, V ). So the optimal action for the manipulators is to approve of all candidates except p. ❑ Theorem B.19 approval-C D C PC RPC -TE TP -CF MF are each in P.
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) and a preferred candidate of the chair p ∈ C, we can determine in polynomial time if p can be made a winner by partitioning candidates and by runoff partitioning of candidates as follows. For the constructive "TE" cases, since approval elections satisfy unique-WARP, we know from Theorem 4.6 that control is possible if and only if control is possible using partition (C − {p}, {p}). The manipulators can preclude p from winning if and only if there is a candidate c = p that can be made to uniquely win using partition (C − {p}, {p}). This can easily be checked by having all manipulators approve of only c.
For the constructive "TP" cases, note that control is possible if and only if the manipulators cannot vote so that p does not become a winner in (C, V ). So the optimal action for the manipulators, regardless of who goes first, is to approve of all candidates except p. Similarly, for the destructive cases, control is possible if and only if the manipulators cannot vote so that p becomes a winner (for the "TP" cases) or a unique winner (for the "TE" cases) in (C, V ). So the optimal action for the manipulators, regardless of who goes first, is to approve of only p. ❑ Theorem B.20 approval-M+DCPV-TE TP is in P.
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) and a despised candidate of the chair p ∈ C, we can determine in polynomial time if p can be precluded from winning by partitioning voters for the "TE" case as follows.
Lemma B.21 If there exists a partition of voters such that p is not an approval winner in the "TE" ("TP") model when all manipulators approve of only p, then there exists a partition such that p can never be made an approval winner by the manipulators in the same tie-breaking model.
Proof. The proof for the "TE" case follows similarly to the proof of Lemma B.7, so we just provide the proof of the "TP" case. Given an election (C, V ) and a candidate p ∈ C, we do the following. Let (V 1 , V 2 ) be a partition such that p is not a winner when all manipulators approve of only p. If p can never be made a winner by the manipulators in this partition then we are done. So, suppose there exists a manipulation such that p is an overall winner (with the partition (V 1 , V 2 )). Without loss of generality p is a winner of the subelection (C, V 1 ). Then if all manipulators in V 1 approve of only p, we know that p remains a winner of (C, V 1 ). Note we don't get any new winners in (C, V 1 ). Since p is not an overall winner if all manipulators approve of only p there is a candidate c = p such that if all manipulators vote for p, c is a winner of (C, V 2 ) and score(c) > score(p). Now move all manipulators from V 2 to V 1 . Note that c remains a winner of (C, V 2 ) and that c will always beat p in the runoff. It follows that in this new partition, p is never a winner, no matter what the manipulators do. ❑ Lemma B.21 implies that approval-DCPV-TE-CF and approval-DCPV-TP-CF are both in P, since control is possible if and only if (nonmanipulator) control is possible when all manipulators approve of only p. This can be checked using the corresponding polynomialtime algorithms from Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07] , modified in the obvious way for the nonunique-winner case (see Observation 4.5).
Theorem B.22 approval-DCPV-TE TP -CF are both in P.
Lemma B.21 above also implies that the corresponding manipulators-first cases are both in P. The proof of the following theorem follows from a similar argument as the proof of Theorem B.9.
Theorem B.23 approval-DCPV-TE TP -MF are both in P.
